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I "9t DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
with other issues, i.e., the statute controlling licensing of the exhibiting
of motion pictures, 17 and a criminal statute.' 8 In any event, the court held
that "nudity in itself and without lewdness or dirtiness is not obscenity in
law or in common sense"' 9 and appears not to adhere to the possible ex-
tension of obscenity to that which provokes lustful or lascivious thoughts,
as it quotes the following from the decision rendered in People v. Muller:
If the test of obscenity or indecency in a picture or statue is its capability of
suggesting impure thoughts, then indeed all such representations might be con-
sidered as indecent or obscene. 20
That the decisions of the Supreme Court in Roth and Alberts have
crystallized some of the concepts and removed many of the ambiguities
existing in the treatment of obscene publications is evident. To what
degree they have set the stage for indiscriminate and arbitrary censorship
remains to be seen.
17 N.Y. Education Law (McKinney, 1953) c. 16, §§ 122 and 124 give the Regents the
duty of licensing motion pictures unless the, film or a part thereof is "obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend
to corrupt morals or incite to crime."
18 Ibid., at c. 39, § 1140(b), making any person guilty of a misdemeanor "... who in
any place wilfully exposes his private parts in the presence of two or more persons of
the opposite sex whose private parts are similarly exposed. . . ." This statute mentions
neither movies nor nudism.
19 Authority cited note 16 supra at 241 and 34.
20 96 N.Y. 408, 411 (1884).
CONTRACTS-IMPOSSIBILITY EXISTING AT THE TIME
OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT NO DEFENSE
On February 19, 1942, Dr. Zellmer was sued for divorce. The decree
stipulated that Dr. Zellmer pay the premiums on several life insurance
policies, and make his children, one of whom was the plaintiff, benefi-
ciaries of the policies. At the time of the promise the policies had been
lapsed for non-payment of premiums for eleven years and therefore per-
formance of the promise was impossible when made. Dr. Zellmer died and
the policy was uncollectible. The named insured filed the present claim
against Dr. Zellmer's estate for breach of contract. The estate's defense of
existing impossibility was overruled and the claim was allowed for the
amount of the policy. In re Estate of Zellmer, 1 Wis. 2d 46, 82 N.W. 2d
891 (1957).
Although this precise point of law has seldom been encountered in the
courts of this country, the Zellmer case illustrates a fundamental point
in impossibility law. The governing principle of law is stated in the Re-
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statement of Contracts.' It states that a promise to perform an impossibie
act is binding, where the impossibility existed at the time of the contract
and where the promisor knew or should have known of the impossibility.
In the instant case, eleven years prior to the time Dr. Zellmer promised to
pay the premiums on the policy, said policy had lapsed because of non-
payment of a premium. Dr. Zellmer's promise was binding even though
performance was impossible since Dr. Zellmer had occasion to know or
should have known of the existing impossibility.
Impossibility may exist at the time a bargain is entered into or may be
due to subsequent events. If the impossibility exists at the time the con-
tract is entered into, there may or may not be liability; liability is depend-
ent upon whether or not the promisor knew or had cause to know of the
existence of the impossibility. In the instant case the court held Dr. Zell-
mer's estate liable notwithstanding the fact that actual performance was
impossible. If Dr. Zellmer, however, had had no reason to know, and did
not in fact know of the existence of the impossibility, he would not have
been liable. 2
It is ordinarily supervening impossibility that is referred to when the
question of impossibility, as a defense to contracts, is considered. 3 In cases
of supervening impossibility, liability always exists at the time the contract
is entered into, whereas in cases of existing impossibility, liability may or
may not exist at the time the contract is entered into. The types of super-
vening impossibility which excuse performance are: impossibility by local
law, 4 impossibility caused by death or serious illness of a promisor whose
promise is personal,5 non-existence of a specific thing necessary for per-
formance of the contract 6 and non-existence of essential facts or circum-
stances other than specific things or persons. 7 The Zellmer case illustrates
an example of existing impossibility wherein the promisor was held liable
because he knew or should have known of the existing impossibility. His
liability, therefore, could not be excused. In cases involving supervening
impossibility, the liability exists at the time the contract is entered into but
it is subsequently discharged.
The Wisconsin Court in the instant case discussed the recently decided
I "Except as stated in sec. 455, or where a contrary intention is manifested, a promise
imposes no duty if performance of the promise is impossible because of facts existing
when the promise is made of which the promisor neither knows nor has reason to
know." Rest., Contracts § 456 (1932) (italics added).
2 Ibid.
3 6 Williston, Contracts S 1933 (1938).
4 Rest., Contracts § 458 (1932).
5 Rest., Contracts § 459 (1932).
6 Rest., Contracts § 460 (1932).
7 Rest., Contracts S 461 (1932).
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Australian case of MacRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission." A
brief summary of the facts reveals that during World War II a number
of ships became wrecked or stranded in the waters adjacent to New
Guinea. After the war, the defendant commission had the function of
disposing of these ships as it saw fit. The commission advertised for sale
"an oil tanker on Jourmaund Reef approximately one hundred miles north
of Samarai (New Guinea)." The plaintiffs tendered a bid for the purchase
of the tanker which was accepted by the commission, resulting in a con-
tract for the sale of the vessel to the plaintiffs. There was no ship answer-
ing the description of the tanker lying near the location indicated. The
court held that the commission had been guilty of "the grossest negli-
gence" in advertising for sale a ship that did not exist. Since there was
no such tanker in existence, there had been a breach of contract and the
plaintiffs were held entitled to recover damages for the breach.
The Australian case and the instant case both dealt with contracts that
were impossible of performance when made. In the Zellmer case the pol-
icy had lapsed prior to the making of the contract and in the MacRae
case the ship, for all practical purposes, had no existence. In both cases
the contracts were enforced. The Australian court based its decision on an
interpretation of the contract rather than on the inapplicability of any
principles of impossibility of performance. The gist of the Australian
court's holding was that "the only proper construction of the contract
is that it included a promise by the commission that there was a tanker
in the position specified." 9
The Wisconsin court referred to a discussion of the Australian case in
the Modern Law Review.10 The author in stating his approval of the
Australian decision, states:
The way is becoming clearer towards explanation of the relevant principles
in terms of construction and offer and acceptance rather than within the frame-
work of an independent and spurious category of mistake."
The Wisconsin court, however, preferred to follow the view expressed
by the Restatement of Contracts12 and refused to base liability on an
interpretation of the contract. In explanation of this contention the court
stated:
To interpret the instant contract as containing a promise by Dr. Zellmer that
the policy in question was in force and effect at the time of entering into the
stipulation, is to invoke a legal fiction.... Therefore, we prefer to ground our
8 84 Commonwealth Law Rep. 377 (1951).
9 25 Australian Law. J. 425, 430 (1951).
10 15 Modem L. Rev. 229 (1952).
11 Ibid., at 232.
12 Authority cited note 1 supra.
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decision in the instant case squarely upon the principle enunciated in 2 Restate-
ment Contracts, sec. 456, supra. A promisor should not be excused from respond-
ing in damages for breach of contract on the ground of impossibility of per-
formance due to mistake in a situation, where, due to his own negligence, he had
failed to discover at the time of entering into the contract the nonexistence of
the fact or thing which made performance by him impossible. It is on this basis
that we determine that Dr. Zellmer's estate must be held liable to the claimant.' 3
13 In re Estate of Zellmer, 1 Wis. 2d 46, 51, 82 N.W. 2d 891, 894 (1957).
CRIMINAL LAW-REFUSAL TO ORDER SANITY
HEARING ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Defendant was convicted of murder. Prior to and at the time of trial,
defendant rejected appointed counsel and conducted his own defense with
counsel present to lend assistance. Defendant's counsel suggested, in his
opening argument, that the defendant was possibly insane. The remark
was objected to, and in an argument in chambers, defendant strenuously
denied he was then or had ever been insane, and stated he would not plead
insanity in any case. Defendant conducted his defense in a very unortho-
dox manner with frequent religious allusions and intimidation of his
counsel. The court refused two tendered instructions on insanity by
appointed counsel. The question of defendant's sanity was also raised in
a motion for a new trial. In overruling the motion, the court stated that
it believed the defendant to be sane. It was held on appeal that the record
raised serious doubt as to defendant's sanity at the time of the trial and
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to direct a sanity hearing.
The judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial. People v.
Burson, 11111. 2d 360, 143 N.E. 2d 239 (1957).
At common law, a person, while insane, cannot be tried, sentenced or
executed.' The test for present insanity is stated as an appraisal of the
present ability of the accused to so understand the nature and purpose of
the proceedings taken against him as to be able to conduct his own defense
in a rational manner.2 The common law rule has been codified in all juris-
dictions with various procedural methods of determining present insan-
ity.3 Perhaps the most progressive statute regarding present insanity is the
famed "Briggs Law" of Massachusetts which provides:
' People v. Maynard, 347 I11. 422, 179 N.E. 833 (1932); 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law,
§ 44 (1938); 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 940 (1940).
2 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, § 45 (1938); 44 C.J.S., Insane Persons, § 127 (1940);
3 A.L.R. 94.
3 The Illinois Statute provides, "A person that becomes lunatic or insane after the
commission of a crime or misdemeanor shall not be tried for the offene during the con-
tinuance of the lunacy or insanity.... In all of these cases, it shall be the duty of the
court to impanel a jury to try the question whether the accused be, at the time of
the impaneling, insane or lunatic." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, § 593.
